The Necessity of Nuclear Bombing to End the Pacific War

Before starting any essay, you need to take sides, either to defend or support a claim. Do you think it was necessary to bomb Hiroshima and then again Bomb Nagasaki three days later? Well, I think it was necessary. I present my arguments in the paper below. Read through. You might learn how to write history paper from the shoulders of a giant. 

The Necessity of Nuclear Bombing to End the Pacific War

The deployment of two atomic bombs over the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki remains the only event where one nation used a nuclear weapon over another. In what is considered one of the most controversial military decisions ever made, the US hit Hiroshima with a uranium-based warhead on August 6, 1945, and Nagasaki with another plutonium-based bomb on August 9, 1945. These attacks happened against a backdrop of an intense military standoff between Japan and the nations allied to the United States. After the Allied Forces’ remarkable success in Europe, Japan was the only stubborn thorn in the flesh that called for strategic action. By this time, the United States was already sponsoring research into nuclear weapons through the homegrown Manhattan Project. Therefore, the US was having a perfect weapon that would immediately bring Japan to its knees. The use of atomic bombs was the ultimate strategy that would force Japan to surrender and, subsequently, end the Pacific War.  The decision to use atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was motivated by the observation that Japan was not going to surrender as symbolized by its execution of the Ketsu Go strategy, the intention to involve the Soviet Union as a mediator, and the various revelations of deliberations by the imperial government. 

The Ketsu Go strategy was a move to bind the military, the government, and the people and fortify the Japanese spirit during the War (Frank, 2013). The June 1945 Imperial Conference sanctified the strategy where men and women, both young and old, would be recruited to fight for the country. Men between the age of 15 and 60 years and women aged 17 to 40 years would be compelled to join a national militia (Frank, 2013). Civilians equipped with weapons as simple as sharpened bamboo poles were asked to fight alongside the military as the defensive front against the mainland’s invasion (PBS, 2022). Desperate civilians jumped over the cliff rather than fight in a war that everybody saw Japan losing. According to PBS (2022), “the Japanese had a substantial basis to believe that Ketsu Go could deliver something to them better than unconditional surrender.” This implies that Japan was prepared to resist the US invasion of its mainland. It had not shown any chances of surrendering, and a lethal attack was the only option remaining to force the assumption of this choice. 

Before the US dropped the bombs on Japan, Emperor Hirohito’s government had reached out to the Soviet Union to help develop terms for a ceasefire. Frank (2013) notes that “at the emperor’s bidding, Japan initiated tentative steps to secure the Soviet Union as a mediator to procure a negotiated end to the war – but not to surrender.” However, the Japanese government representative in Moscow was opposed to this move. The ambassador, Naotake Sato, was skeptical that the Soviet Union would be ready to offer any help in terms of mediation. Sato maintained that Japan’s motto was “Fighting to Finish,” and Moscow would probably convince Tokyo to surrender. Sato also argued that if Japan was ready to end the war, it would have presented the terms of an agreement to Moscow in a bid to ask for its help as a mediator. However, such terms were not available by the time Tokyo was reaching out to the Soviet Union. This means that Japan was determined to continue the fight indefinitely. The dropping of the bombs thus halted all efforts by Japan to seek mediation and prompted its unconditional surrender.

While the US and her allies were making plans to attack Japan, Emperor Hirohito, his advisors, Prime Minister Suzuki, and the government cabinet ministers were holding closed doors meetings to deliberate on their strategic moves. The discussion in these meetings centered around taking the war ahead, the possibility of surrender, and the conditions of surrender if this was to be the case. A series of exposes that the American government intercepted exhibit the intensity of these discussions and the disagreements among Japanese leaders. These channels of communication, codenamed “Magic,” revealed the various proceedings of the Japanese military strategists. Frank (2013) notes that in one of the communique, some Japanese envoys in Western Europe were willing to present themselves as “peace entrepreneurs” to the United States as a means to seek the latter’s commitment to supporting a path to surrender. However, it was discovered that this decision did not have the backing of the top Japanese government officials, including Emperor Hirohito. Frank (2013) also cites that “the military intercepts, without exception, demonstrated that Japan was girding for an Armageddon battle.” Another revelation by the “Magic” was that for Japan to surrender, the American government had to meet a set of conditions.  The Emperor’s demands included “no American occupation of Japan, exclusive control by the Japanese government over the conduct of war crimes trials, and retention of jurisdiction by Imperial Headquarters over disarmament and demobilization” (Villa & Bonnett, 1996). Truman would not agree to these terms, meaning that bombing the country was the only way to end the Pacific War. 

Other explanations as to what ended the Pacific war are not as convincing as the orthodox school of thought is. Two historians have remained perpetual belligerents in this argument. Robert Maddox of the orthodox perspective maintains that if Truman had not used the bombs, any invasion to force the end of this war would have been bloodier. On the contrary, Gar Alperovitz decries that the bombs were “requited evil” since Japan was already forging plans to surrender, a fact that Truman was aware of (Villa & Bonnett, 1996). While both historians have information lined up to support their claims, it is indeed true that an alternative intervention would have had a massive loss of lives for both sides. Moreover, America had already spent a tremendous amount of human and monetary resources in World War II. Scores of its soldiers had lost their lives, and the nation had grown weary of fighting.  At that point, President Truman was pursuing a means of ending the war, and as initially intended, the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki effectively brought the Pacific War to a halt.

In conclusion, the use of two atomic bombs was necessary since Japan was not ready to surrender as indicated by the military rearrangements, engagement of Russia in mediation, and intercepts that revealed the discussion of closed-door meetings. The Ketsu Go strategy initiated before the bombings sought to fortify the Japanese defensive front, underscoring its zeal to continue the war. By asking the Soviet Union to act as a mediator, it was clear that Japan was not willing to surrender. Mediation talks would only uphold Japanese terms, which was contrary to the wishes of the Allied Forces. The emperor, prime minister, and other cabinet officials held meetings that would later be intercepted by the US intelligence mercenaries. The deliberations in these meetings showed that Japan would not surrender without condition, meaning that lethal force was the only intervention to would enforce this surrender. If the bombs were not used, any invasion could lead to massive loss of lives and property, an experience that America and its allies did not wish to relive. 

Yea, Professors Write Papers; A+ Papers

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